

**Customers' Choice Among Retail Energy Suppliers:
The Willingness-to-Pay for Service Attributes**

by

Andrew Goett and Kathleen Hudson
AAG Associates

and

Kenneth Train
Department of Economics
University of California, Berkeley

March 8, 2000

Author for correspondence: Kenneth Train, Department of Economics, 549 Evans Hall #3880, Berkeley, CA 94720-3880. Email: train@econ.berkeley.edu Voice: 510-642-6649. Fax: 510-642-0638.

Abstract: We examine small/medium commercial and industrial customers' choices among energy suppliers in conjoint-type experiments. The distribution of customers' willingness to pay is estimated for over forty attributes of suppliers, including sign-up bonuses, amount and type of renewables, billing options, bundling with other services, reductions in voltage fluctuations, and charitable contributions. These estimates provide guidance for suppliers in designing service options and to economists in anticipating the services that will be offered in competitive retail energy markets.

Acknowledgement: The data collection and analysis were sponsored by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). We are grateful to Ahmad Faruqi and EPRI for allowing us to present results from the study.

Customers' Choice Among Retail Energy Suppliers: The Willingness-to-Pay for Service Attributes

I. Introduction

Under “open access” for retail energy, customers are free to choose among suppliers of the energy commodity, with the traditional utility providing transmission and distribution (at least for now.) Several states, including California, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, currently allow open access for all customers, and many other states are moving in that direction. The outcome of this competition depends critically on customers' choice behavior. The power of competitive pressures to lower prices depends on the degree to which customers are willing to switch suppliers in response to offers of lower prices. The introduction of new products and services depend on the distribution of customers' willingness to pay for service attributes. If there is little variation in customers' preferences, and/or those preferences are largely satisfied by incumbents' services, then there will be little opportunity for entry by suppliers with new service attributes or for innovation by the incumbents. Conversely, with large differences in customers' preferences, with existing services not meeting the range of preferences, the opportunity for profitable new service offerings abounds.

There is only limited evidence on the factors that affect customers' choice of energy supplier. In California and Massachusetts, very few mass-market customers (i.e., residential and small/medium commercial customers) have switched providers, even though open access has been available for two years in these states. However, as Train and Selting (2000) point out, there have been practically no price discounts offered by new suppliers to mass market customers in these states and, consequently, little opportunity for customers to evidence whatever price-sensitivity that they might have. In Pennsylvania, new suppliers have offered larger discounts, and customers have responded by switching in not insubstantial numbers. Switch rates as high as 20% have been

observed in some areas of Pennsylvania.¹ To our knowledge, no formal estimation has been performed on the market data for open access states, presumably because of the limited variation in the attributes of the suppliers' offers.

Cai, et al. (1998), Goett (1998) and Revelt and Train (1998) have used data from conjoint experiments to examine customers' preferences regarding energy suppliers. In these experiments, each surveyed customer is presented with several hypothetical offers by energy suppliers and is asked to identify the offer that he/she would choose.² These experiments have the advantage of being able to include service attributes that have not been offered in real-world markets, or have not varied sufficiently in markets to allow estimation. Goett and Revelt/Train examined the type of pricing (fixed, time-of-day, and seasonal), length of contract, and type of supplier (the local utility, a company known by the customer other than the local utility, or an unknown company.) Cai et al. examined price, outages, and whether the supplier used renewable sources, had conservation programs, and had as many customer services as the respondent's current supplier.

These studies found substantial variation in preferences across customers. At the mean preferences, customers in the Goett and Revelt/Train studies were found (i) to evaluate time-of-day and seasonal rates as being worse than a fixed price at the average of the variable rates, (ii) to prefer not being locked into a long-term contract, and (iii) to prefer the local utility to a known company, and a known company to an unknown one. The

¹ The difference among these states in the discounts that were offered seems to be due to the way that open access is structured in each state. In California, the incumbent is required to sell energy (i.e., the commodity) to mass-market customers at the price that is established by the power exchange (PX). A new supplier can offer customers a lower price only if it can consistently supply energy at a cost below the PX price; however, if it can supply energy at a cost below the PX price, then the firm would make more profit by selling to the PX rather than selling to customers at the lower price. In Massachusetts and Pennsylvania, the commodity price for the incumbents is set administratively by the regulator, with different prices for different parts of each state. The prices in Massachusetts were set sufficiently low that new suppliers seem unable to beat them, whereas the prices in Pennsylvania were set sufficiently high to engender entry by price-discounters. We are not offering an opinion on which pricing procedures are most appropriate, since there are advantages and dangers associated with each. For example, the rules in California and Massachusetts might be preventing beneficial entry, or the Pennsylvania prices might be inducing inefficient entry.

² Cai et al presented customers with a hypothetical offer and asked whether the customer would switch from its current provider.

variation in preferences around these means was found to be sufficient to sustain a variety of contracts of different lengths, entry by known companies (though perhaps not by unknown companies), time-of-use and seasonal rates for selected customers, and entry by low-cost suppliers who serve highly price-sensitive customers. Cai et al. found that the number of outages was by far the most important service attribute, followed by customer service. Renewables and conservation programs were found to be less important for most customers. However, the exact meaning of these service attributes was undefined; e.g. suppliers were described simply as having “fewer customer services” than the customer’s current supplier, or having “more outages.”

In the current paper, we extend the conjoint-type research of these previous studies by examining more attributes and by attempting to be more precise in our specification of the attributes. In particular, we examine customers’ preferences for over forty potential service attributes, ranging from the extent of voltage fluctuations to whether the supplier contributes a portion of its profits to local charities. We tried to define these attributes fairly precisely, such as “fluctuations of no more than 2% in voltage for a few cycles at a time no more than 10 times during a year,” and “contributes up to 2% of annual profits each year to local not-for-profit organizations.” Of course, some attributes by their nature are difficult to pin-down, such that we ended up using terms that still left a degree of ambiguity.

We restrict our analysis to small and medium commercial customers. We estimate the distribution of preferences among these customers, and their willingness to pay for the various attributes. The results provide guidance to economists and regulators in anticipating and interpreting market outcomes as well as in establishing and administering market rules that serve to enhance the welfare (i.e., satisfy the preferences) of customers. The information can also assist suppliers in designing service offerings.

Our analysis uses mixed logit models, which provide a flexible specification for representing the distribution of preferences in the population and the choices of each

customer. The method has been applied previously in transportation (Bhat, 1996; Brownstone and Train, 1999), recreation demand (Train, 1998), and energy (Goett, 1998, and Revelt and Train, 1998, 1999). Our analysis is complicated by the fact that the number of attributes that we examine is greater than can feasibly be included in one choice experiment. The procedure that we adopt is to conduct choice experiments for subsets, called “clusters,” of attributes. Price is included in all the experiments, to serve as the link among the experiments. A mixed logit model is estimated on each cluster of attributes separately. The price variable, which is common to all clusters, allows the results in each model to be translated into willingness to pay estimates that are comparable across clusters.

The data are described in section II. The mixed logit procedure is presented in section III. Results are presented and discussed in section IV. Section V concludes.

II. Data

The sample and instrument were designed by a team of researchers³ under the sponsorship of the Electric Power Research Institute. A total of 1205 small and medium customers were interviewed in a phone-mail-phone format. Customers were first recruited by phone. Each customer who agreed to participate was mailed a packet of materials. This packet included a series of choice experiments. In each experiment, the attributes of four hypothetical suppliers were described. In the subsequent follow-up by phone, the interviewer asked the customer to state which of the four suppliers the customer would choose if facing the choice in the real world.

An important goal was to examine a wide variety of services and attributes that might matter to customers and that might thereby become important in markets in the future. As stated above, over forty attributes were included in the survey. The large number of attributes presented challenges for the design of the experiments. It was not feasible (as

borne out by pre-tests) to include all of the attributes in any one choice experiment. That is, we could not describe forty or more attributes for each of four suppliers and then ask the customer to choose among the suppliers. Customers were not able to assimilate such large amounts of detailed information. To make the choice tasks manageable, the attributes were grouped into clusters. The clusters consisted of:

- (A) Pricing and contract terms, including time-of-day, seasonal, and hourly rates, contract length, and sign-ups bonuses,
- (B) Green energy attributes, namely, the amount and type of renewables,
- (C) Customer services, including billing options, web-based information sources, and availability of service representatives,
- (D) Value-added services, such as energy audits, financing for equipment purchases, warranties on new equipment, and reliability,
- (E) Community presence, including donations to schools, non-profits, or children's programs, and the presence of local offices.

In each experiment, four hypothetical suppliers were described with respect to the attributes in one cluster only. For example, in the experiments for cluster (A), customers were presented with offers that differed with respect to the type of pricing (fixed, variable, etc.) and contract terms. The customer was told to consider all other attributes of the suppliers to be the same for all suppliers in the experiment. All of the experiments included price (in cents per kWh for the energy commodity) as an attribute, as well as the type of supplier (listed below.) Figure 1 gives an example of a choice experiment.

Customers were presented with four experiments for each cluster of attributes. That is, each customer was presented with four hypothetical suppliers whose attributes within the cluster varied and was asked to choose among them; this exercise was repeated four times for each customer. In total, each customer was presented with 20 choice experiments

³ Steve Braithwait, Patricia Garber, Dan Hansen, David Linewebber, Lisa Wood, and Joel Huber, in addition to the authors, who performed the estimation.

(four for each of the five clusters.) The levels of the attributes differed over experiments and customers to provide sufficient variation for use in estimation.

The surveyed customers were sampled through a stratified random design, using customer lists from Dunn and Bradstreet. Customers were sampled more than proportionately in the service territories of the energy companies that helped to finance the study with EPRI and less than proportionately in other areas. (The over-sampling allowed each participating energy company to obtain analysis and forecasting for their own area.) Weights were developed that are consistent with the sampling procedure, such that the weighted sample is asymptotically equivalent to a purely random sample drawn from the population of small and medium customers throughout the country. We present results for the weighted sample. Details of the sample and survey design are given by EPRI (2000).

III. Model Specification

We use a mixed logit model (e.g., Revelt and Train, 1998) to represent the choices of customers. Each customer, labeled n , faces several choice situations, indexed by t . As explained above, each customer in our survey faced four choice experiments for each of the five clusters of attributes. In each choice situation, the customer faces a choice among several suppliers, indexed by i . In our survey, there were four suppliers in each choice situation. The attributes of supplier i as described to customer n in experiment t are denoted by the vector X_{niti} . The utility that customer n would obtain from supplier i in experiment t is specified as:

$$U_{niti} = \beta'_n X_{niti} + \varepsilon_{niti} ,$$

where β_n denotes the value that the customer places on the attributes, and ε_{niti} is an error term. The coefficients β_n vary randomly over customers, reflecting the fact that different

customers have different tastes regarding suppliers' attributes. We assume that β_n is distributed normally in the population with mean b and covariance W .⁴

The error term, ε_{nti} , captures other factors that might affect the customer's choice. We assume this term is iid extreme value. This assumption is what makes the model a mixed logit instead of another type of choice model, such as mixed or pure probit (see Brownstone and Train, 1999, for a discussion of the types of models.) Importantly, McFadden and Train (2000) show that the assumption of an extreme value error term is benign: any choice model can be approximated to any degree of accuracy with a mixed logit, i.e., with a model whose final error term is iid extreme value.

The choice probabilities are derived as follows. Conditional on the customer's tastes as denoted by β_n , the probability that customer n chose supplier i in experiment t is a logit formula, since the remaining random term, ε_{nti} , is iid extreme value (McFadden, 1973):

$$L(i, t, n | \beta_n) = \frac{e^{\beta_n' X_{nti}}}{\sum_j e^{\beta_n' X_{ntj}}}$$

Also, since ε_{nti} is independent over experiments, the conditional probability for customer n 's sequence of choices in all the experiments is the product of logit formulas:

$$P(y_n | \beta_n) = L(y_{n1}, 1, n | \beta_n) \cdot \dots \cdot L(y_{nT}, T, n | \beta_n) \quad .$$

where y_{nt} identifies the alternative that customer n chose in experiment t , and y_n is the vector $\{y_{n1}, \dots, y_{nT}\}$ that identifies the sequence of choices.

⁴ Mixed logit allows any distribution for the random coefficients β_n . In other applications, log-normal, uniform, triangular, and truncated normals have been used. Our reasons for using a normal distribution are given in section IV below.

The customer's tastes are not known, and so useable choice probabilities cannot be conditioned on β_n . The unconditional probability of the customer's choices is obtained by integrating the conditional probability over all possible values of β_n using the population distribution of β_n :

$$P(y_n | b, W) = \int P(y_n | \beta) f(\beta | b, W) d\beta$$

where $f(\beta | b, W)$ is the normal density with mean b and covariance W .

The goal of estimation is to obtain information on the population distribution of tastes associated with each attribute of suppliers, that is, on the mean b and covariance W of tastes in the population. Estimation is complicated by the fact that the integral in P_n does not have a closed form. Its value is approximated numerically through direct simulation. The simulated probability for each customer is inserted onto the log-likelihood function, which is maximized with respect to b and W . We used Halton draws in simulation instead of random draws so as to increase the accuracy of the estimation (Bhat, 1999; Train, 1999). For each model, we used 250 draws per customer.

IV. Estimation Results

Tables A-E gives the estimated models for each cluster of attributes. There are four salient features of the specification for all of these models. (1) Price enters both linearly and in log form. We found in preliminary analysis that customers' willingness to pay for non-price attributes depended on the level of prices. For example, customers were willing to pay more for a desirable attribute when the price was 10 cents per kWh than when price was 4 cents per kWh. This behavior, while contradicting economic rationality, is intuitively meaningful and conforms to many analysts' view of how customers commonly make decisions. Stated alternatively, it takes more to compensate a person for a 25% price increase (e.g., a 1 cent increase from 4 cents per kWh) than a 10% price increase (a

1 cent rise from 10 cents per kWh) even if the absolute price change is the same in both cases.

The inclusion of price and its log allows the model to capture the relation between willingness to pay and the price level. The willingness to pay for an attribute is calculated as $\partial U/\partial x$ divided by $-\partial U/\partial p$ -- that is, the coefficient of the attribute divided by the (negative of the) derivative of utility with respect to price. In our specification, $-\partial U/\partial p = a+(c/p)$, where a and c are the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of price and $\log(\text{price})$. The willingness to pay for an attribute is $b/(a+c/p)$, where b is the estimated coefficient of the attribute. If customers are willing to pay a fixed amount for the attribute, independent of price level, then $c=0$ and willingness to pay is b/a , which is constant. If customers are willing to pay a fixed percentage of price, then $a=0$ and willingness to pay is $(b/c)p$, and the ratio b/c is the fixed percent of price that customers are willing to pay. Behaviors in-between these two possibilities are captured by a and c both being non-zero.

(2) The price coefficients are fixed rather than varying over customers. There are several reasons for this specification. First, as discussed above, the willingness to pay for an attribute is the ratio of the attribute's coefficient to the derivative of utility with respect to price. When the price coefficients are fixed, the distribution of willingness-to-pay has the same form as the distribution of the attribute's coefficient. For example, if an attribute's coefficient is normally distributed then the willingness to pay for the attribute is also normally distributed. If the price coefficients were allowed to vary, then the willingness to pay for any attribute would be distributed as the ratio of two distributions, which is more difficult to work with. Also, choosing a distribution for the price coefficient is difficult, and the common distributions pose problems for our purposes. In particular, a normal distribution allows implausible positive price coefficients, and log-normals, which avoid incorrectly signed price coefficients, allow the price coefficient to be arbitrarily close to zero, which provides implausibly high estimates of willingness to pay (since the price

coefficient enters the denominator in this calculation.) To avoid these difficulties, we have held the price coefficient fixed.⁵

(3) The coefficients of the non-price attributes are specified to be normally distributed. Since the normal distribution has support on each side of zero, this specification implies that, for each attribute, there are some customers who like the attribute and others who dislike it. Estimation of the mean and standard deviation of the normal distribution determines the proportion with each kind of preference.

If an attribute is known to be appealing to all customers (or disliked by all customers), then a more appropriate specification would be a log-normal or other distribution that has support on only one side of zero, as in Train, 1998, and Revelt and Train, 1999. Our discussion with participants in the EPRI project suggested that, for each non-price attribute in the survey, there are customers who like and other customers who dislike the attribute. For example, monetary contributions by suppliers to schools or to non-profit organizations are seen differently by different customers. Some customers see these contributions as commendable, indicating a social conscience by the supplier. Other customers see the contributions as wasteful or as an arrogant usurping the customer's decision on how and when to contribute. A normal distribution accounts for both of these views and allows the model to estimate the proportion of customers with each view.

(4) Correlation among customers' tastes for different attributes are captured by variable definitions rather than with covariance parameters. We restrict the random coefficients that enter the model to be independent of each other. (That is, we restrict W to be diagonal.) Important correlation is captured, then, by appropriate definition of variables. For example, suppliers might contribute to local not-for-profit organizations or buy computers for local schools. Customers who value one type of contribution are likely to also value the other type. Two variables are entered: one for whether the supplier

⁵ Some applications of mixed logits allow the price coefficient to vary (e.g. Train, 1998) while other do not (Revelt and Train, 1999). The appropriate approach in any setting depends on the data and the goals of the analysis.

contributes in either way, and a second one identifying that the contribution is for school computers. The coefficient of the first variable captures the value that the customer places on the supplier contributing to not-for-profit organizations. The second coefficient captures the value of contributing to school computers relative to not-for-profit organizations. (The sum of the two coefficients gives the value of contributions to school computers relative to no contributions.) Since the coefficients are normally distributed, the model allows some customers to value school-computer contributions more than contributions to not-for-profit organizations, while others have the opposite preferences.⁶

In the paragraphs below, we discuss some of the salient findings. However, the tables provide far more information than we discuss. Readers who are interested in particular attributes can use the information in Tables A-E to determine the estimated distribution of coefficients and willingness to pay for those attributes. For example, it is often useful to determine the portion of customers who are willing to pay more for a service attribute than it costs the supplier to provide the attribute. The information in Tables A-E can be used to calculate, for any attribute, the share of customers whose willingness to pay for the attribute exceeds a specified amount.

Price. As stated above, price is given in cents per kWh and is for the energy itself (which is what the customer is buying from the supplier), exclusive of transmission, distribution, and other charges. Also, price enters both linearly and in log form, so as to account for the observed behavior under which customers respond to price differences differently depending on the level of price. In the experiments for attribute clusters B-E, price is always a fixed price. In the cluster A experiments, rate options are included under which prices vary by time-of-day, seasonally, or hourly. In these experiments, the average price under the schedule enters the model, with the average calculated based on expected load shape for the each customer. Other variables capture variations around this average.

⁶ Other applications of mixed logit have estimated off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix (e.g., Train, 1998, and Revelt and Train, 1998.) In principle either approach could be used in any situation. The variable definition approach is usually easier when only a few correlations are being estimated, such that the covariance matrix would have many elements constrained to zero.

Consider the estimated price coefficients in the model for cluster A; the results for the other models are similar. At the estimated coefficients, $\partial U/\partial p = -(0.633 + 1.346/p)$. Customers consider a marginal price increase to be more onerous when price is low than when price is high. For example, in discrete terms, a rise from 3 to 4 cents is viewed as being worse than a rise from 6 to 7 cents. However, customers do not go so far as to consider price changes in percentage terms; that is, they do not consider equal percent increases to be equally onerous. An increase from 3 to 4 c (which is 33%) is considered less onerous than an increase from 6 to 8 c (also 33%).

In calculating the willingness to pay for an attribute, the attribute's coefficient is divided by $-\partial U/\partial p$. The tables provide figures for the willingness to pay for each attribute when price is 5 cents per kWh. The estimated nonlinearity in $\partial U/\partial p$ implies that willingness to pay for any attribute in Table A is 17% lower when price is 3c than at a price of 5c, and is 15% higher when price is 9c than at a price of 5c. Analogous ranges are obtained for the attributes in Tables B-E.

Supplier type. The choice experiments included six types of suppliers, identified to respondent as: “your local electric company”, “an affiliate of your local electric company,” “a neighboring electric company,” “a well-known energy company”, “a well-known non-energy company,” and “an unfamiliar energy company.” In the models, “your local electric company” is taken as the base, such that the coefficients of the variables that identify the other types reflect the value that customers place on each type of supplier relative to the local electric company.

The average coefficients imply that, on average, customers prefer their local company to any other type. The second best is the affiliate or a well-known energy company, which are viewed about the same. Next is a neighboring electric company and a well-known non-energy company, which are viewed similarly. Worst is an unfamiliar energy company. Interestingly, a company that specializes in energy but is otherwise unfamiliar

to customers is viewed as being worse, by the average preferences, than a company that does not specialize in energy but is familiar to customers. This result might imply that companies like the telecommunications carriers, or even Sears and Home Depot, might be more successful than new energy companies like Enron.

Customers differ in their attitudes toward each type of company. The estimated standard deviations allow us to calculate the share of customers that prefer each type of company to the local utility (and vice versa.) As indicated in the last column of Table A, fourteen percent of customers prefer an unfamiliar energy company to the local utility. These customers might have had a bad experience in the past with their local utility, or have some other reason to want to leave the local company. Importantly, the share is probably large enough for an unknown energy company to enter successfully, provided it can identify and market itself to these customers. On the other hand, the share might not be large enough to be divided up by several unfamiliar energy suppliers.

On average, customers are willing to pay 0.62 cents more per kWh to obtain service from their local company instead of from the affiliate or a well-known energy company. (We give these figures to two decimal places to allow the reader to see the corresponding figure in the table; obviously, the results are not meant to be considered as being this precise, given the standard error on the estimates.) Customers are willing to pay, on average, 1.30c more for the local company compared to a neighboring electric company, 1.37c more compared to a well-known non-energy company, and 2.34c extra compared to an unfamiliar energy company. These average willingness to pay figures need to be viewed appropriately. They do not mean that, for example, an unfamiliar energy company would need to offer a 2.34c discount in order to enter the market successfully. Rather, the estimates imply that an unfamiliar energy company would obtain the same market share as the local utility if it offered a 2.34c lower price and all of its other attributes were the same. Few entrants have such optimistic expectations of potential market share. With a smaller discount, the entrant's market share would be lower than the local utility, but still perhaps sufficient to justify entry. The estimated standard deviation of the coefficient

implies, for example, that an unfamiliar electricity company that offered a half-cent price reduction (off of a price of 5c) would be preferred to the local electric company by 20% of customers, provided of course that all other attributes were seen as being the same. Similar information can be calculated for other types of suppliers.

Sign-up bonuses. Three kinds of bonuses were included in the choice experiments: a \$50 check at the time of sign-up, a \$100 check after staying with the supplier for one year, and a coupon given at sign-up worth \$100 towards the purchase of energy equipment. The estimated means and standard deviations for these bonuses are all insignificant, and the hypothesis that customers do not value them at all cannot be rejected. Considering the point estimates, the vast majority of customers seem actually to dislike the offer of a \$50 sign-up check or a \$100 coupon. Only 17% and 9%, respectively, of customers consider these offers to provide a positive inducement. This result perhaps reflects the small size of the bonuses relative to customers' bills, such that customers are disdainful of the offer. It also perhaps reflects customers' negative experience with similar inducements by long-distance telecommunications carriers.

The bonus of a \$100 check after a year is viewed as a slightly positive inducement for most customers. The bonus is worth less than one-tenth of a cent per kWh on average, which is small compared to the impact of other attributes. However, this willingness to pay might be sufficiently high for suppliers to consider this option. For example, for a customer with 1000 kWh consumption per month, a 1/10 c higher price translates into \$100 over 10 months, which repays the bonus. Of course, this discussion is highly speculative, since the estimated mean and standard deviation are both insignificant. Perhaps the most reasonable conclusion regarding sign-up bonuses is that our analysis indicates that customers do not seem to respond much to them.

Contracts. Four contract options were included in the experiments: no contract, or a contract of 1, 2 or 3 years. Under each of the contracts, the customer was required to pay a penalty equal to its most recent monthly bill if the customer changed suppliers during

the contract period. The contract also obligates the supplier to charge the specified price during this period. The contract therefore constrains the customer but also provides the customer insurance against possible price increases. Customers can place either a positive or negative value on having a contract, depending on the relative importance of these factors.

Two variables enter the model regarding contracts: a dummy for whether a contract is required and a variable for the length of the contract in years. The value of a one-year contract is the sum of the two coefficients, while the additional value for each additional year is captured by the second coefficient. This specification induces correlation in the value that customers place on one, two, and three year contracts: customers who have a higher-than-average value for one year contracts will tend to also value two and three year contracts more than average.

The estimates indicate that most customers dislike being locked into a contract more than they value the price guarantee that the contract provides. Nevertheless, there is sufficient variation over customers in their attitudes toward contracts to sustain a variety of contract lengths in a competitive market. The average value of a one-year contract is negative, meaning that on average customers would rather not have a contract than have a one-year contract. A supplier would need to discount its price by 0.27 cents per kWh (i.e., 0.09-0.36) in order to compensate for this negative average valuation. The majority of customers -- 59% -- prefer no contract to a one-year contract. Two- and three-year contracts are considered even more onerous by most customers. On average, customers are willing to pay 0.63 cent per kWh and 0.99 cent per kWh to avoid two and three year contracts, relative to no contract.

Despite the average preferences, a large share of customers do indeed prefer having a contract. As indicated above, 41% prefer a one-year contract to no contract, and 32% and 25% prefer a two- and three-year contract to none. These customers are willing to pay

extra in return for a guaranteed price. These customers are a marketing opportunity for suppliers that are able to manage the risk.

Variable rates. The choice experiments included seasonal, time-of-day, and hourly rates in addition to fixed (non-variable) rates. The average price under variable rates was calculated for each customer based on expected load profiles. The model included this average price as well as dummy variables indicating the type of variable rate.

For time-of-use and seasonal rates, the model included the difference between the highest and lowest rates (i.e., the difference between summer and winter rates under seasonal prices and the difference between on- and off-peak prices under time-of-day pricing.) These difference variables obtain insignificant estimates for both the mean and standard deviations of their coefficients. The hypothesis cannot be rejected that all customers ignore the amount of variation in prices around the average price. In contrast, the dummy variables that identify the type of rate schedule enter with highly significant means and standard deviations, with the estimated means being negative. These results in combination suggest that customers have a negative reaction to these rates, without the reaction being related directly to the amount of variation in the prices.

Hourly rates are considered worse, on average, than time-of-day rates; time-of-day rates are considered worse than seasonal rates; and seasonal rates are considered worse than fixed rates. The average price under hourly rates would need to be nearly 3.91 cents per kWh lower than under a fixed price rate in order to compensate for the average preference against hourly rates. For time-of-day and seasonal rates, the comparable compensation is 1.4 and 0.8 cents per kWh. The estimated standard deviations are sufficiently small that fewer than 14% of customers prefer a seasonal rate to a fixed rate when the average price is the same. Comparable figures for customers preferring time-of-use rates and hourly rates are 12% and 4%. Of course, shares of 12% and 14% (and maybe even 4%) are still sufficiently large to justifying offering these rates as options to customers.

Renewables. Table B relates to renewable energy sources. In the choice experiments, the customer was told the percentage of the suppliers' energy that was generated through renewable sources (ranging from none to 100%). The customer was also told the type of renewable source, with the possibilities being "primarily from hydro," "primarily from wind," and "primarily by a mix of renewables including geothermal, biomass (landfill gas), and solar. "

The estimates indicate that the majority of customers prefer hydro or a mix of sources to wind. However, preferences are diverse, with 36% preferring wind to hydro. Suppliers with different mixes of renewable sources can find sufficient customers for each type without difficulty.

The amount that customers are willing to pay is highly non-linear in the percent of energy that is generated with renewables. For hydro, customers, on average, are willing to pay 1.46 cents per kWh ($1.28 + 0.72/4$) extra for a supplier that has 25% hydro power relative to a supplier with no renewables, and yet are willing to pay only 0.18c ($0.72/4$) extra for a supplier that has 50% hydro than one that has 25% hydro. These estimates suggest that customers are more concerned about the concept of renewable than the actual impact of the use of renewables on the environment. This result is consistent with contingent valuation studies of environmental damage that have found that the amount that customers are willing to pay to prevent environmental damage (such as saving ducks from being oil slicked) is independent of the amount of damage that is prevented (e.g., the number of ducks that are saved by the prevention efforts.)

The estimates suggest that customers are willing to pay, on average, 2.0 cents per kWh ($1.28+0.72$) for a supplier that uses 100% hydro than for a supplier with no renewable sources, and 1.45c more for 100% wind than for no renewables. Given the estimated standard deviations, some customers are willing to pay considerably more than these average amounts. The results suggest that customers are vitally concerned about the renewables.

Personal Service. Table C includes various attributes relating to customer service. Four levels or types of interaction with the supplier were specified:

- A voice response system answers when the customer calls
- A real person answers the telephone when the customer calls
- The customer's service representative answers the telephone and can address the customer's concerns "on the spot"
- The customer's service representative answers the telephone, visits the customer on site, and can address the customer's concerns "on the spot"

Three variables enter the model, designed in a way that establishes correlation in the value for these three levels of service. The first variable indicates that the customer deals with a person rather than a voice response system and indicates any of the levels beyond the first (voice system) level. The second and third variables indicate, respectively, whether the service "rep" answers the phone (level 3) and whether the service "rep" makes on-site visits (level 4).

The estimates in Table C suggest that being able to deal with a real person is very important for most customers. On average, customers are willing to pay 1.35 cents per kWh extra for the assurance of being able to talk to a real person, as opposed to having to deal with a voice message system, presumably. 31% of customers are willing to pay over 2 cents per kWh. These high values suggest that suppliers can profitably incur the extra staffing costs that are required to enable customers to talk to real people, provided that the supplier can differentiate itself to customers on the basis of this service.

The estimates indicate that having a service representative available by phone is not particularly valuable as an additional service beyond simply having a person who answers the phone. Both the estimated mean and standard deviation of this variable's coefficient are insignificant, such that the hypothesis cannot be rejected that no customers are willing to pay for this extra service. Interestingly, most customers prefer not to have their service

representative visit them on-site. The mean coefficient is negative and highly significant, and the estimated standard deviation is only slightly larger than the estimated mean. Apparently, the vast majority of customers view on-site visits by their service reps as a bother to be avoided. Suppliers should take this finding to heart when trying to keep their customers satisfied.

Billing Options. Four types of billing options were considered in the experiments:

- choice of payment options, including credit or debit card, automatic draft, internet, check or cash (as opposed to payment only by check or cash)
- customized billing, which allows the customer to choose the frequency of bills, billing date, and which energy usage and price comparison information to include with the bill
- consolidation of bills for gas, water and electricity, and
- aggregation of electric demand (kW) and usage (kWh) for all the facilities in the customer's business, with a single bill.

Each of these services is found to be valuable to the majority of customers. Customized billing is the most valued, with 80% of customers being willing to pay at least some positive amount for it. The average willingness to pay is 0.38 cents per kWh. The other three services are seen as valuable by around sixty percent of customers, with an average willingness to pay of about a fifth to a quarter cent per kWh. While the amount that customers are willing to pay is low, the cost of providing these services is also low. A competitive market can therefore be expected to include at least some suppliers that provide these services.

Websites. Suppliers can offer information and services on websites to assist their customers. Three types of websites were specified in the experiments:

- energy usage and information site, which allows the customer to learn about new products and services, review information about equipment-specific energy use, and read recommendations for ways to save energy

- energy use notification site, which notifies the customer when its usage goes beyond a pre-specified level
- energy transactions site, which is interactive and allows the customer to change pricing plans, check on energy usage, and sign-up for or drop products and services.

The model included an indicator variable for whether the supplier has any of these three types of websites, as well as indicator variables for the notification and transaction sites. The coefficient of the first variable therefore captures the value of a usage and information site (as opposed to no site), and the coefficients of the other two variables capture the value of notification and transaction sites, respectively, relative to a usage and information site. As discussed above, defining the variables in this way provides for correlation among the values that customers place on all three types of sites.

A usage and information site is found to be the most valuable to customers. It is preferred to no site by 61% of customers. While most customers prefer a notification or transaction site to no site, they value a usage and information site even more. A usage and information site is preferred to a notification site by nearly all customers, and is preferred to a transactions site by 76% of customers. The average willingness to pay for any of these sites is fairly low: 0.43 cent per kWh for a usage and information site, 0.12c for a notification site, and 0.17c cent for a transactions site. However, given the small cost of providing websites such as these, and especially the low marginal cost once the site is created, suppliers will probably find it profitable to provide them.

Bundled Services. Suppliers can bundle electricity service with other services. The experiments examined the value that customers place on being able to buy other services from the same supplier. The bundling options are that the electricity supplier also offers:

- natural gas, propane, and oil, at the same price the customer pays now
- financing services for new electrical equipment, at prime rate
- free warranties and maintenance contracts for new electrical equipment

- free energy audits, and, if the customer chooses, installation of recommended equipment free-of-charge with the savings shared 50/50

The results are given in Table D. Free energy audits with a shared savings option were found to be valued by a larger share of customers than any other bundled service. However, the average willingness to pay for audits is lower than for bundling with other fuels or for free warranties and maintenance contracts on new equipment. For example, 85% of customers place a positive value on the audits while only 69% place a positive value on the warranties. However, the average willingness to pay for the audits is only 0.3 cents per kWh while the average willingness to pay for the warranties is higher -- 0.4 cents per kWh. This pattern is perhaps due to the fact that the warranties are available for new equipment purchases. Only customers who plan to purchase new equipment would benefit from the warranties, while most customers can obtain at least some value from an audit. However, for customers who plan to purchase new equipment, the value of the warranties is considerably higher than the value of an audit. Consistent with this interpretation, the standard deviation in the willingness to pay for free warranties is higher than that for free audits. The value of free warranties depends on the extent of new equipment that the customer expects to purchase, which can differ greatly over customers.

Bundling of fuels is valued by 72% of customers, and the average willingness to pay for this bundling is 0.69 cents per kWh. This fairly high willingness to pay suggests that suppliers could readily attract customers by bundling electricity service with other fuels.

The offering of financing services at prime rate is the least successful of the bundled services. The average willingness to pay is essentially zero. In fact, the mean and standard deviation of this variable are both insignificant, indicating that the hypothesis cannot be rejected that no customers are willing to pay for this service.

Reliability. In the choice experiments, customers were asked to consider suppliers that offered different levels of reliability. The customer was told that it could expect, on average,

- two short outages per year, of 30 seconds each
- four short outages per year, of 30 seconds each
- two outages per year, of 30 minutes each, or
- four outages per year, of 30 minutes each.

All outages were said to occur on a weekday afternoon. In the model, the fourth (least reliable) option was taken as the base, against which the others are compared. Variables represent increasingly higher levels of reliability, so as to create correlation in the value that customers place on the various levels of improvement.

The estimates indicate that customers are willing to pay considerably to reduce outages. Customers are willing to pay, on average, 1.21 cents per kWh to reduce outages from 4 30-minute outages to 2 such outages per year. Reducing outages from 2 30-minute outages to 4 30-second outages is worth an additional 0.65 cents, on average. And reducing to 2 30-second outages is worth an additional 0.91 cents, on average. In total, customers are found to be willing to pay, on average, 2.77 cents per kWh for a supplier that can guarantee no more than 2 30-second outages compared to a supplier with 4 30-minute outages per year. These high values are consistent with the findings of Cai et al.

Power Fluctuations. Similar results are obtained with respect to power fluctuations. Suppliers were described as guaranteeing certain maximum amounts of fluctuations in voltage. The possible levels were:

- no noticeable fluctuations in voltage during the year (a 100% power quality guarantee)
- fluctuations of no more than 2% in voltage for a few cycles at a time, no more than 10 times during a year

- fluctuations of no more than 2% in voltage for a few seconds at a time, no more than 10 times during a year
- fluctuations of no more than 2% in voltage for a few minutes at a time, no more than 10 times during a year.

The last (worse) level was taken as the base, and variables represent increasingly higher service quality. Customers are found to be willing to pay, on average, 0.31 cents per kWh to reduce the durations of fluctuations from a few minutes to a few seconds. Customers are willing to pay considerably less to reduce the duration from a few seconds to a few cycles. However, a guarantee of no fluctuations at all is very valuable. Customers on average are willing to pay 1.01 cent per kWh for a guarantee of no fluctuations relative to fluctuations that last a few seconds, and 0.93c relative to fluctuations for a few cycles.

Contributions. Customers might care whether their electricity supplier makes charitable contributions or invests in local economic development. In fact, suppliers in other industries have often advertised their contributions as a way of attracting customers. In the choice experiments, suppliers were described as making contributions to the community in one of two different ways. In the first, either:

- The supplier makes no investment in local economic development
- The supplier earmarks up to 2% of annual profits each year for local economic development activities and economic development rates
- The supplier earmarks up to 5% of annual profits each year for local economic development activities and economic development rates

In the second, either:

- The supplier donates no money to local charities
- The supplier contributes up to 2% of annual profits each year to local not-for-profit organizations
- The supplier contributes up to 2% of annual profits each year to create a program in which every dollar spent by consumers contributes to a pool of money that local schools can use to buy computer equipment

- The supplier contributes up to 2% of annual profits each year to local programs for kids.

No contributions or earmarking of profits for local development was taken as the base in each case. One variable indicates earmarking for local development at either level, and a second variable indicates whether the development earmarking is 5% rather than 2%. For contributions, one variable indicates that any of the types of charitable contributions is made, with two additional variables indicating whether the contribution is to a computer-for-schools program or to programs for kids, as opposed to local not-for-profit organizations.

The vast majority of customers prefer suppliers that make some form of contribution. It does not matter much, on average, whether the firm earmarks funds for development or makes contributions. The average willingness to pay is essentially the same for development funds as for contributions (0.93c and 0.92c), and nearly the same share of customers prefer a firm that earmarks funds for development as opposed to doing nothing, as prefer a firm that makes some type of contribution as opposed to doing nothing (80% and 77%).

Interestingly, earmarking 5% of profits for development seems to have about the same effect on customers, on average, as earmarking 2%. This result is consistent with the finding above for renewables: the concept of the social good is more important to consumers than the actual amount of good that is produced.

Customers also do not seem to care, on average, what the firm contributes to, provided of course that the supplier contributes. Customers' willingness to pay is not significantly different, on average, for a supplier that makes contributions to computer-for-schools program or other programs for kids versus contributions to not-for-profit organizations. The standard deviations are large, however, which indicates that individual customers have preferences, sometimes strong ones, as to the form of the supplier's contributions. These differences suggest that a supplier might want to offer different options to

customers, such as one service under which profits would be donated to programs for kids, another service whose profits go to computers for schools, and so on.

Local Presence. Finally, the importance of local presence was tested. Suppliers were differentiated as:

- No local presence: the supplier does not have a local office open to the public and customers contact the supplier by phone
- Some local presence: the supplier maintains some local offices where customers can pay bills or talk to a customer representative
- Extensive local presence: the corporate headquarters or a major office is located in the customer's immediate area.

No local presence was taken as the base. One variable indicates a local presence (either some or extensive), and a second variable indicates whether the local presence is extensive.

Customers are found to care greatly about the presence of the supplier. 78% of customers are willing to pay a positive amount to have a supplier with a local presence, and 61% are willing to pay to have an extensive presence instead of just some presence. The average willingness to pay for local presence is 1.2 cents per kWh. This amount places local firms at a strong advantage over suppliers that might provide service from afar.

V. Discussion

The estimates in Tables A-E provide very detailed information, only some of which we have highlighted above. As we state in the introduction, researchers and suppliers who are interested in particular service attributes can use the tables to investigate the specific questions that are important to them.

We want to conclude with an important caveat. In choice experiments, customers can have a tendency to de-emphasize price, since they do not have to actually pay the price.

This de-emphasis, to the extent that it exists, creates an upward bias in the estimated willingness to pay for non-price attributes. It might be prudent, therefore, to adjust downwards the willingness to pay figures in Tables A-E by some constant factor. Unfortunately, it is not clear what that factor should be. This potential ambiguity does not, however, affect all of the results. The percent of customers with a positive willingness to pay is unchanged by this adjustment, since both the mean and standard deviation are affected similarly. Also, the relative willingness to pay for different attributes is unaffected by the adjustment. For example, if the willingness to pay for one attribute is twice that for another attribute, this factor of two is the same whether or not customers de-emphasize price. The most reliable information in the tables is, therefore, the share of customers with positive willingness to pay, and the ratios of willingness to pay for different non-price attributes.

References

Bhat, C., 1996, "Incorporating Observed and Unobserved Heterogeneity in Urban Work Travel Mode Choice Modeling," working paper, Department of Civil Engineering, University of Texas, Austin.

Bhat, C., 1999, "Quasi-Random Maximum Simulated Likelihood Estimation of the Mixed Multinomial Logit Model," forthcoming, *Transportation Research*.

Brownstone, D., and K. Train, 1999, "Forecasting New Product Penetration with Flexible Substitution Patterns," *Journal of Econometrics*, Vol. 89, No. 1, pp. 109-129.

Cai, Y., I. Deilami, and K. Train, 1998, "Customer Retention in a Competitive Power Market: Analysis of a 'Double-Bounded Plus Follow-ups' Questionnaire," *The Energy Journal*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 191-215.

Electric Power Research Institute, 2000, *ShareWars Study Results: Predicting Customer Choices in Electricity Markets in the US*.

Goett, A., 1998, *Estimating Customer Preferences for New Pricing Products*, Electric Power Research Report TR-111483, Palo Alto.

McFadden, D., 1973, "Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior," in P. Zarembka, ed., *Frontiers in Econometrics*, Academic Press, NY.

McFadden, D., and K. Train, 2000, "Mixed MNL Models for Discrete Response," forthcoming, *Applied Econometrics*.

Revelt, D., and K. Train, 1998, "Mixed Logit with Repeated Choices: Households' Choices of Appliance Efficiency Level," *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. LXXX, No. 4, November, pp. 647-657.

Revelt, D., and K. Train, 1999, "Customer-Specific Taste Parameters and Mixed Logit," working paper, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley.

Train, K., 1998, "Recreation Demand Models with Taste Differences Over People," *Land Economics*, Vol. 74, No. 2, pp. 230-239.

Train, K., 1999, "Halton Sequences for Mixed Logit," working paper, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley.

Train, K. and A. Selting, 2000, *The Effect of Price on Residential Customer Choice in Competitive Retail Energy Markets: Evidence from Specific Markets to Date*, Edison Electric Institute report.

Figure 1. Example of Choice Experiment

If you had to choose one of these *four electricity supply offers*, which **ONE** would you choose?
(Circle one letter)

A	B	C	D
<ul style="list-style-type: none">◆ A neighboring electric company◆ Fixed price of 4 ¢ per kWh◆ 50% renewable energy ◆ Mix of renewables, including geothermal, biomass, and solar energy	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◆ An affiliate of your local electric company◆ Fixed price of 5 ¢ per kWh◆ 25% renewable energy ◆ Primarily wind energy sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◆ A well-known energy company◆ Fixed price of 3 ¢ per kWh◆ 50% renewable energy ◆ Primarily wind energy sources	<ul style="list-style-type: none">◆ An unfamiliar energy company◆ Fixed price of 5 ¢ per kWh◆ 100% renewable energy ◆ Primarily wind energy sources

Cluster A: Pricing/Discount Choices

Variable	param	estimate	t-stat	wtp@5	% > 0
Average or “expected” price, cents/kWh	value	-0.63296	7.83		
Natural log of price	value	-1.34608	3.74		
1 if rate is seasonal, 0 otherwise	mean	-0.75312	4.19	-0.83	14%
	st dev	0.69606	2.94	0.77	
Difference between summer and winter prices (0 for non-seasonal rates)	mean	0.01127	0.25	0.01	54%
	st dev	0.12348	1.55	0.14	
1 if rate is time-of-day, 0 otherwise	mean	-1.23676	4.64	-1.37	12%
	st dev	1.05660	4.19	1.17	
Difference between daily on-peak and off-peak price (0 for non-TOD rates)	mean	-0.03229	0.45	-0.04	41%
	st dev	0.14792	0.98	0.16	
1 if rate is hourly, 0 otherwise	mean	-3.53050	14.19	-3.91	4%
	st dev	1.99551	9.36	2.21	
1 if contract required, 0 otherwise	mean	0.07789	0.69	0.09	54%
	st dev	0.83456	4.00	0.93	
Length of contract (1, 2 or 3 yrs)	mean	-0.32126	5.84	-0.36	29%
	st dev	0.59285	10.26	0.66	
1 if sign-up benefit is “a check for \$50 right away”, 0 otherwise	mean	-0.15516	1.62	-0.17	17%
	st dev	0.16079	0.67	0.18	
1 if sign-up benefit is “a check for \$100 after one year with provider”, 0 otherwise	mean	0.08824	0.91	0.10	59%
	st dev	0.38641	1.41	0.43	
1 if sign-up benefit is “a \$100 coupon for energy efficient products”, 0 otherwise	mean	-0.04219	0.49	-0.05	9%
	st dev	0.03083	0.41	0.03	
1 if electricity supplier is “an affiliate of your local electric company”, 0 otherwise	mean	-0.56327	4.10	-0.62	24%
	st dev	0.78141	3.39	0.87	
1 if electricity supplier is “a neighboring electric company”, 0 otherwise	mean	-1.17247	7.19	-1.30	8%
	st dev	0.84246	3.86	0.93	
1 if electricity supplier is “a well-known energy company”, 0 otherwise	mean	-0.55772	3.78	-0.62	10%
	st dev	0.42630	1.01	0.47	
1 if electricity supplier is “a well-known non-energy company”, 0 otherwise	mean	-1.23231	6.91	-1.37	10%
	st dev	0.96515	4.70	1.07	
1 if electricity supplier is “an unfamiliar energy company”, 0 otherwise	mean	-2.11213	9.38	-2.34	14%
	st dev	1.97534	9.60	2.19	

Cluster B: Green Energy Choices

variable	param	estimate	t-stat	wtp@5	%>0
Fixed price of electricity, cents/kWh	value	-0.51264	7.75		
Natural log of price	value	-2.11346	6.78		
1 if “primarily hydro energy sources”, 0 otherwise	mean	1.19477	7.44	1.28	91%
	st dev	0.89893	4.65	0.96	
1 if “primarily wind energy sources”, 0 otherwise	mean	0.67863	4.19	0.73	73%
	st dev	1.12271	7.64	1.20	
1 if “mix of renewables”, 0 otherwise	mean	1.23055	7.27	1.32	91%
	st dev	0.89888	4.65	0.96	
Percent renewable (continuous variable with values of 0, .25, .75, and 1)	mean	0.67112	4.15	0.72	60%
	st dev	2.70272	11.76	2.89	
1 if electricity supplier is “an affiliate of your local electric company”, 0 otherwise	mean	-0.64314	4.98	-0.69	19%
	st dev	0.72555	1.86	0.78	
1 if electricity supplier is “a neighboring electric company”, 0 otherwise	mean	-1.11644	7.79	-1.19	11%
	st dev	0.91533	3.40	0.98	
1 if electricity supplier is “a well-known energy company”, 0 otherwise	mean	-0.67635	4.88	-0.72	3%
	st dev	0.34989	0.34	0.37	
1 if electricity supplier is “a well-known non-energy company”, 0 otherwise	mean	-1.24005	8.20	-1.33	10%
	st dev	0.95812	4.97	1.02	
1 if electricity supplier is “an unfamiliar energy company”, 0 otherwise	mean	-2.17879	10.50	-2.33	7%
	st dev	1.47929	6.73	1.58	

Cluster C: Customer Service Choices

variable	param	estimate	t-stat	wtp@5	%>0
Fixed price of electricity, cents/kWh	value	-0.49142	6.12		
Natural log of price	value	-2.68231	7.00		
1 if "deal with real person (by telephone or on site)", 0 otherwise	mean	1.39237	10.32	1.35	85%
	st dev	1.37104	7.91	1.33	
1 if "direct telephone access to your service representative", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.08546	0.98	-0.08	43%
	st dev	0.48364	1.57	0.47	
1 if "on-site visits from your service representative", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.62742	5.00	-0.61	26%
	st dev	0.96694	5.86	0.94	
1 if "choice of payment options", 0 otherwise	mean	0.22894	2.56	0.22	59%
	st dev	1.03371	7.74	1.01	
1 if "customized billing", 0 otherwise	mean	0.38788	4.20	0.38	80%
	st dev	0.46399	2.01	0.45	
1 if "consolidated billing across utility services", 0 otherwise	mean	0.25426	2.30	0.25	60%
	st dev	1.00175	5.27	0.97	
1 if "aggregation of bills", 0 otherwise	mean	0.19677	1.73	0.19	62%
	st dev	0.62986	2.57	0.61	
1 if supplier has any type of website, 0 otherwise	mean	0.43724	3.32	0.43	61%
	st dev	1.55162	9.76	1.51	
1 if "energy use notification website", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.32318	3.29	-0.31	0%
	st dev	0.11155	1.09	0.11	
1 if "energy transactions website", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.26285	2.38	-0.26	24%
	st dev	0.37026	1.00	0.36	
1 if electricity supplier is "an affiliate of your local electric company", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.60969	4.27	-0.59	13%
	st dev	0.55268	1.94	0.54	
1 if electricity supplier is "a neighboring electric company", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.89720	5.41	-0.87	21%
	st dev	1.11243	5.94	1.08	
1 if electricity supplier is "a well-known energy company", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.75000	4.98	-0.73	14%
	st dev	0.70366	2.15	0.68	
1 if electricity supplier is "a well-known non-energy company", 0 otherwise	mean	-1.19421	7.14	-1.16	13%
	st dev	1.06899	3.54	1.04	
1 if electricity supplier is "an unfamiliar energy company", 0 otherwise	mean	-2.12079	10.51	-2.06	5%
	st dev	1.27892	5.95	1.24	

Cluster D: Value-Added Services

variable	param	estimate	t-stat	wtp@5	%>0
Fixed price of electricity, cents/kWh	value	-0.31351	5.29		
Natural log of price	value	-1.65819	5.89		
1 if "natural gas, propane, or oil at same price you pay now", 0 otherwise	mean	0.44348	6.04	0.69	72%
	st dev	0.76478	5.56	1.19	
1 if "electrical equipment financing at prime rate", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.01213	0.13	-0.02	48%
	st dev	0.23498	1.06	0.36	
1 if "free warranties/maintenance contracts for new electrical equipment", 0 otherwise	mean	0.25915	3.00	0.40	69%
	st dev	0.53261	2.52	0.83	
1 if "energy audit and 50/50 shared savings", 0 otherwise	mean	0.19502	2.44	0.30	85%
	st dev	0.19167	0.70	0.30	
1 if "expect two 30 minute outages a year" or less, 0 otherwise	mean	0.78201	4.72	1.21	86%
	st dev	0.73308	2.36	1.14	
1 if "expect four 30 second outages a year" or less, 0 otherwise	mean	0.41719	4.41	0.65	69%
	st dev	0.86591	5.54	1.34	
1 if "expect two 30 second outages a year" or less, 0 otherwise	mean	0.58715	7.06	0.91	74%
	st dev	0.91689	6.85	1.42	
1 if voltage fluctuations are no more than seconds in duration, 0 otherwise	mean	0.19735	2.13	0.31	64%
	st dev	0.56828	3.04	0.88	
1 if voltage fluctuations are no more than cycles in duration, 0 otherwise	mean	0.05476	0.57	0.08	53%
	st dev	0.62710	2.91	0.97	
1 if "100% power quality guarantee", 0 otherwise	mean	0.59763	6.57	0.93	87%
	st dev	0.51999	1.56	0.81	
1 if electricity supplier is "an affiliate of your local electric company", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.48195	3.70	-0.75	18%
	st dev	0.53228	1.92	0.83	
1 if electricity supplier is "a neighboring electric company", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.58334	5.51	-0.90	0%
	st dev	0.00691	0.03	0.01	
1 if electricity supplier is "a well-known energy company", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.52703	3.78	-0.82	22%
	st dev	0.68840	3.10	1.07	
1 if electricity supplier is "a well-known non-energy company", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.98512	6.85	-1.53	10%
	st dev	0.76453	3.43	1.19	
1 if electricity supplier is "an unfamiliar energy company", 0 otherwise	mean	-1.43321	9.17	-2.22	8%
	st dev	1.01062	4.05	1.57	

Cluster E: Community Presence Choices

variable	param	estimate	t-stat	wtp@5	%>0
Fixed price of electricity, cents/kWh	value	-0.39051	7.19		
Natural log of price	value	-2.33332	8.05		
1 if "earmarks up to 2% or 5% of profits to local economic development", 0 otherwise	mean	0.79900	8.61	0.93	80%
	st dev	0.94431	7.50	1.10	
1 if "earmarks up to 5% of annual profits to local economic development", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.11405	1.26	-0.13	44%
	st dev	0.80328	4.84	0.94	
1 if "contributes 2% of profits to some charitable program", 0 otherwise	mean	0.79186	7.14	0.92	77%
	st dev	1.07596	7.47	1.26	
1 if "contributes 2% of profits to create a computers-for-schools program", 0 otherwise	mean	0.03523	0.36	0.04	52%
	st dev	0.74558	4.76	0.87	
1 if "contributes 2% of profits to create local programs for kids", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.18642	1.67	-0.22	41%
	st dev	0.81893	4.85	0.96	
1 if "any local presence (some or extensive)", 0 otherwise	mean	1.04601	9.28	1.22	78%
	st dev	1.34612	10.30	1.57	
1 if "extensive local presence", 0 otherwise	mean	0.12392	1.55	0.14	61%
	st dev	0.46481	2.03	0.54	
1 if electricity supplier is "an affiliate of your local electric company", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.40854	3.36	-0.48	0%
	st dev	0.00228	0.01	0.00	
1 if electricity supplier is "a neighboring electric company", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.83837	6.03	-0.98	12%
	st dev	0.70874	3.09	0.83	
1 if electricity supplier is "a well-known energy company", 0 otherwise	mean	-0.53169	3.99	-0.62	9%
	st dev	0.38906	1.15	0.45	
1 if electricity supplier is "a well-known non-energy company", 0 otherwise	mean	-1.14501	7.21	-1.34	15%
	st dev	1.10212	5.45	1.29	
1 if electricity supplier is "an unfamiliar energy company", 0 otherwise	mean	-1.37380	8.29	-1.60	4%
	st dev	0.76421	3.73	0.89	

